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HOW TO REFER TO YOURSELF WHEN TALKING TO YOURSELF
*
 
 
ANDERS HOLMBERG 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In talk addressed to yourself (for those who engage in such activity) either I or you can be 
used when referring to yourself (e.g. What's wrong with me? or What's wrong with you?). 
The use of you is constrained, though. It can’t refer to the self in assertions about the self’s 
state of mind, including thoughts, feelings, and intentions. In those cases I is the only option. 
This is because self-talk-you is 'mindless', thus sharing with ordinary dialogue-you the 
property of not being controlled by the mind of the speaker. In self-talk there is a speaker (I) 
and an addressee (you), who can even be represented in the same sentence (I know you can do 
it!), both pronouns denoting the self. This is possible, without violation of any principles of 
binding, because in normal self-talk there is ONLY ONE MIND, which can only be addressed as 
I.  
 
1.  Introduction 
 
 The following are some reflections on a phenomenon which, as far as I have been able 
to determine, has not previously been given any attention within linguistic theory, namely 
self-talk, also called intrapersonal communication or inner dialogue.
1
 This is when you talk to 
yourself, audibly or inaudibly. Another term is ‘private speech’, which, however, is mainly 
applied to children’s self-talk, with themselves or with imaginary interlocutors, which is 
typical of children between about two and seven (Vygotsky 1986, Berk 1994, Winsler & al. 
2009). Self-talk, as investigated here, is not speaking to imaginary interlocutors, but speaking 
to yourself, the self being speaker as well as addressee. Children’s private speech has been 
the subject of a fair amount of research by developmental psychologists. Self-talk among 
adults is a recognised phenomenon (see Brinthaupt & al. (2009) and references there), but 
appears not to have had the same amount of serious attention, certainly not by linguists. The 
more specific topic of this paper is how you refer to yourself, in self-talk. Given that you are 
speaker as well as addressee, do you refer to yourself as I or as you? As I will show, you can 
do either. Thus (1a) and (1b) are both acceptable in what I will call normal self-talk. You can, 
as it were, assume the role of speaker or addressee, in self-talk. 
 
(1) a. You’re an idiot. 
 b. I’m an idiot. 
 
                                                          
*
 Thanks to the audiences at the SyntaxLab in Cambridge and the NESS meeting in York for comments and 
discussion. Thanks also to Halldór Sigurðsson and especially Noel Burton-Roberts and a referee for NWPL, 
who disagree with me on certain points, perhaps with good reason.  
1
 ‘Inner dialogue’ is a particularly misleading term, since, as will be discussed below, there is no dialogue: The 
communication is strictly one-way, from ‘I’ to ‘you’.  
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There are cases, however, where you can't choose between I and you, in particular, there are 
constraints on the use of you, in self-talk. The purpose of the paper is to try to characterise 
and explain these constraints. The data in this paper are based on introspection (with 
examples translated from Swedish), but have been checked and compared with a number of 
other self-talking individuals, speakers of English as well as other languages. There seems to 
be some variation regarding certain acceptability judgments which cuts across language 
boundaries. This will be discussed in section 5. 
 As regards how common self-talk is, my findings so far indicate that most people (at 
least among academics) engage in self-talk, to varying degrees but enough to have intuitions 
about it, but there is a minority who don’t, and who find it very odd that anyone would 
engage in such practice. 
   
2.  Self-talk data 
 
Consider the following fairly typical examples of self-talk: 
2
   
 
(2) a.   You’re hopeless. 
 b.  What’s wrong with you? 
 c. You can do it! 
 d.  Pull yourself together. 
 
For all of these except (d), an alternative is using I instead of you: 
 
(3) a. I’m hopeless. 
 b.  What’s wrong with me? 
 c. I can do it! 
 d.  *Pull myself/me together. 
 
The reason why (3d) is not well-formed is, surely, that the imperative has an underlying 
subject ‘you’, as a grammatical, inherent property, which the reflexive must agree with, in f-
feature values. The semantic value of the antecedent (the self) cannot override the 
grammatical agreement requirement (as familiar from other cases of pronominal form-
reference mismatch; see Ross (1970: 250) and below). 
                                                          
2
 When googling for ‘self-talk’ you mainly get hits with adverts for various therapies to help you replace 
negative self-talk with positive self-talk. Consider also the following quote from Brinthaupt & al. (2009): 
 
Most research on inner and private speech in adulthood considers facilitative and debilitative self-talk 
in sports or exercise domains [...] or self-talk gone awry, focusing on negative self-statements from the 
perspective of clinical issues such as depression or anxiety.  
 
As will be discussed below, the kind of self-talk discussed here is typically either reproach or encouragement of 
oneself. The former is supposed to be bad for you, causing stress and anxiety, while the latter is good, improving 
your self-esteem. My own self-talk is, I’m afraid, mostly negative, which is reflected in the examples in this 
paper.   
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Can you switch between I and you, though, in the same sentence? Cases such as (4) 
and (5) might seem to suggest that you cannot (the stars and question marks apply to the 
sentences when used as self-talk). 
 
(4) a. You can do it if you try. 
 b.  I can do it if I try. 
 c.  *You can do it if I try. 
 d.  *I can do it if you try. 
 
(5) a. This is your chance to make them notice you. 
 b.  This is my chance to make them notice me. 
 c. *? This is your chance to make them notice me. 
 d.  *This is my chance to make them notice you. 
 
This might seem to suggest that you make the choice between the role of speaker or 
addressee, between ‘I-mode’ and ‘you-mode’ only once per (independent) sentence. It may 
be noted that (4c, d) and to a lesser extent (5c, d) would be odd if they were addressed to a 
‘real’ addressee, as well. This is an indication, to be confirmed below, that self-talk in the 
you-mode is subject to similar discourse conditions as real dialogue. When self-talking in the 
you-mode, you really are the addressee.     
The following data show that you can very well use both pronouns, referring to 
yourself, in the same sentence. 
 
(6) a.  I think I’ve had it. 
 b.  I think you’ve had it. 
 
(7) a.  I don’t know why every time I make the same stupid mistake. 
 b.  I don’t know why every time you make the same stupid mistake. 
 
(8) a.  I can’t believe my luck! 
  b.  I can’t believe your luck! 
 
(9) a. I knew I could do it! 
 b.  I knew you could do it! 
 
In these cases, the matrix verb is a verb of cognition. Strikingly, in this case the matrix 
subject pronoun must be I, not you. The following sentences are unacceptable as self-talk. 
  
(10) a. *You think you’ve had it. 
 b.  *You think I’ve had it. 
 
(11) a. *You don’t know why every time you make the same stupid mistake. 
 b. *You don’t know why every time I make the same stupid mistake. 
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(12) a. *You can’t believe your luck. 
 b.  *You can’t believe my luck. 
 
(13) a.   *You knew you could do it. 
 b.  *You knew I could do it! 
 
Apparently, you can’t refer to the self as holder of thoughts or beliefs, in self-talk.
3
 Consider 
also the following examples: 
 
(14) a. I can’t take this anymore.  
 b.  *You can’t take this anymore. 
  
(15) a. You’re driving me mad. 
 b.  *I’m driving you mad. 
 
(16) a. I’ll try once more, and that’s it. 
 b.  *You’ll try once more, and that’s it. 
 
Apparently, you can’t refer to the self as an experiencer of feelings or holder of intentions or 
plans, either. Generalising, you can’t refer to the self in assertions about the self’s state of 
mind, including thoughts, feelings, and intentions; only I can. 
 
3.   The thinking self and the mindless self 
  
One way to understand the generalisation above is that there are two aspects of the 
self involved: One is ‘controlled by the mind’, with thoughts and feelings, and engaging in 
activities that are wholly transparent and predictable. We might even want to say that it is the 
mind. The other is not under direct control by the mind; it doesn’t think, but does act, 
engaging in activities which are not wholly transparent or predictable, and it is typically in 
need of either reproach or encouragement. The ‘mindless self' can be referred to by either you 
or I (see (3b) for an example of the latter). The thinking and feeling self (the mind) can only 
be referred to by I. A striking property of the referent of you in (normal) self-talk is that he 
never answers back, however much he is insulted. This is, I propose, because he can't think; 
he is a mindless self. The property shared by the referent of you in self-talk and the referent 
                                                          
3
 This claim is too strong in view of examples such as the following, judged to be acceptable as self-talk by 
several  informants. 
(i) You think you’re so clever! 
The crucial difference between (i) and  (10)-(13) may be that the thinking is part of the focus in (i), being the 
object of critique. The sentence does not sound natural as self-talk for me, though. This may be a case where 
there is real inter-speaker variation. Noel Burton-Roberts has supplied the following as a piece of self-talk, 
where it seems to be crucial that the matrix cognition verb is past tense: 
(ii) You didn’t think you could do it, did you? 
Again, for me this sentence is unnatural as self talk. I will leave these differences aside, but see section 5 for 
some observations on variation in self-talk. 
.  
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of you in dialogue is that they are not controlled by the mind of the speaker: Dialogue-you 
because it has a different mind, self-talk-you because it doesn’t have a mind. 
A straightforward (and probably simplistic) way to represent this situation formally is 
to include it as part of the lexical specification of the pronominal forms. The pronoun I would 
have, as part of its lexical specification, a feature [+S(elf’s) M(ind)] while you and other 
pronouns have [-SM]. The semantic import of [+SM] is that the pronoun can denote the self’s 
mind (as well as other aspects of the self). The feature [-SM] is not incompatible with 
reference to the self as long as it is the mindless aspect of the self; this is what we see in the 
well-formed examples of self-talk with you referring to the self. But if the pronoun is an 
argument of what might be called a mind-predicate, that is a predicate about the state of mind 
(cognition, feelings, intentions) of a person, then I is the only option for reference to the self, 
since only I can refer to the self’s mind.
4
 This is why (10-13) and (14a), (15b) and (16a) are 
ungrammatical as self-talk.  
 
4.   Self-talk and the Performative Hypothesis 
 
A partly different account of the generalisation that you in self-talk can't refer to a 
thinking or feeling self, which does not depend on a feature [-SM], is that when addressing 
yourself as you, there is still an I linguistically represented in the sentence, covertly if not 
overtly. This means adopting some version of the classical (and much reviled) performative 
hypothesis (PH) of Ross (1970).
5
 According to the PH, all declarative sentences are 
embedded under a covert ‘performative’ clause  [I SAY to you __], where SAY is an 
underspecified verb of communication. Ross gave a number of arguments in favour of each 
of the three components (I, you, and SAY) of the underlying performative clause of 
declaratives. He gave as many as 10 arguments for a higher subject I. Several of them are 
based on the possibility of an anaphor referring to the speaker in main clauses without an 
overt first person antecedent. (17a, b) are two such cases. 
 
(17) a. Physicists like myself/*himself don’t often make mistakes 
 b.  A friend is going to drop by.   
 
‘Friend’ in (17b) can only be interpreted as ‘friend of mine’, where ‘of mine’  is arguably 
syntactically represented as a DP-internal PRO. (17a, b) contrast with (18a, b), showing that 
third person anaphors are possible in the same context when embedded under a clause like 
[John said _], suggesting that (17a, b) are embedded under a (covert) clause with a first 
person subject. 
 
                                                          
4
 This is not a matter of mind vs. body. You’re an idiot as self-talk does not mean ‘My body is an idiot’. The 
mind-body distinction is, apparently, not deeply rooted in our cognition, but something like ‘controlled by the 
mind’ is. 
5
 See also Sadock (1974). PH-bashing was quite in vogue in the seventies; see Gazdar (1979: 15-35) and 
references there. Much of the critique is of the unconstructive, nit-picking kind that was typical of the debate 
within generative linguistics in the seventies, but it did have the effect that the PH was silenced, until now, more 
than 30 years later, when the idea of a higher ‘I’ in clausal syntax is being seriously explored again (see the text 
below).    
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(18) a. John said that physicists like himself don’t often make mistakes. 
 b. Mary says that a friend is going to drop by.  (à a friend of hers)  
 
The arguments for a higher predicate SAY, and for a higher argument you are fewer in 
number, and rather less compelling than the arguments for a higher I. However, to explain the 
constraints on the form of address in self-talk, the most crucial part of the hypothesis is the 
higher abstract pronoun I. 
 There are some recent ‘neo-performative’ theories, which articulate the idea that all 
finite, independent clauses (and perhaps some dependent clauses) are in the scope of a feature 
or operator ‘I’, represented in the C-domain of the sentence and defining the ‘speaker 
coordinates’ of the sentence (‘I, here, now’), against which the temporal and spatial relations 
in the sentence and the person of the arguments are computed: Schlenker (2003), Sigurðsson 
(2004,  2007), Giorgi (2009). An early forerunner, not listed among the references in any of 
these works, or in Ross (1970), is Buehler (1934). 
I propose that the representation of the speaker, the ‘I’ in the deictic domain, 
presumably the highest subdomain of the C-domain of finite clauses, interfacing with the 
context, is a linguistic feature or feature bundle which denotes the consciousness or mind of 
the speaker; I will call this the deictic feature [my mind] (in Ross’s (1970) PH the mind of the 
speaker is not encoded directly in the performative clause, but is presupposed by the 
underlying performative predicate SAY; to initiate a communicative act you must be a 
‘thinking self’). I also assume the traditional index: a DP has an index as part of its feature 
make-up which encodes its ‘identity’, meaning that every other DP with the same index 
denotes the same individual. Sharing an index also means that the person features must be 
identical. This is why my is ill-formed in (19) (based on Ross (1970)), when uttered by the 
king, referring to himself in the third person (the possibility of this type of self-reference has 
interesting implications for the theory sketched here, which I will, however, ignore). 
 
(19)  The kingi will announce hisi/*myi decision as soon as possible. 
  
The deictic feature [my mind] comes with an index, and every instance of I/me/my in the 
sentence in the scope of [my mind] then has the same index. There is some debate in the 
literature whether I is a constant, necessarily referring to the speaker, or whether, like third 
person pronouns, it is a variable. Schlenker (2003) and Sigurðsson (2004, 2007) argue that it 
is a variable, based on the observation that in some languages the pronoun corresponding to I 
can be used as a logophoric pronoun, and thus can refer to someone other than the speaker in 
certain embedded sentences. See Safir (2005) for discussion. I am not taking a stand on this 
issue here.  
 The definition of the deictic speaker-feature as [my mind] becomes crucial when the 
pronoun you is used to refer to the self. I cannot have the same index as you, by the laws of 
Universal Grammar, because they have different person features. But in self-talk I and you 
can denote the same person, the speaker/the self, even in the same sentence, as in (9b) and 
(15a), for example. This paradox is resolved by interpreting you as mindless: thereby it is 
denotationally sufficiently distinct from I, the mind of the self. They have distinct indices, as 
required by the grammar, and thereby denote distinct entities, namely two different aspects of 
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the self. This is the only way you can be both a speaker and an addressee of the same 
utterance. 
It now follows that if you is the subject of a mind-predicate, as in (10-13), or an  
indirect object of a mind-predicate as in (15d), it can’t be interpreted as referring to the self, 
but only as referring to some other person, who has a mind.
6
 
 The PH and related theories are seen in a new perspective in Timothy J. Crow’s 
theory of schizophrenia (Crow 1998, 2004). According to Crow, schizophrenia is a form a 
deep linguistic disorder, where, to put it in non-specialist terms, the wiring which links the 
departments in the brain which process speech (output and input) with the departments which 
generate and process thought goes wrong. 
 
The first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia are dysfunctions of just such a system [the 
system relating speech and thought: AH]. Neural activity that is internally generated 
(thought) is perceived as having the character of a message (speech) from an 
independent source, and thought itself (along with volition) is perceived as controlled 
from outside the individual. The distinction between what is generated by the self and 
what comes from the outside world, is lost. (Crow 1998: 306). 
 
In other words, schizophrenic subjects hear voices which in reality are their own thoughts, 
and have the sensation of having their mind controlled by somebody else.  Crow relates this 
to the theory of indexicality in Buehler (1934), and notes the possible relevance of Ross’s 
performative hypothesis, in this connection: schizophrenia can be described as a 
malfunctioning of the performative clause identifying the speaker’s speech acts, or, in the 
present terms, of the deictic [my mind], which identifies the speaker’s speech acts and, I 
assume, also his thoughts as generated by the self.  
 As a speculative remark: self-talk is popularly associated with madness or dementia. I 
have proposed here that a characteristic of normal self-talk is a distinction between a thinking 
self (always addressed I) and a mindless self (which can be addressed you). This suggests that 
a characteristic of abnormal self-talk is that this distinction is not upheld, such that the self 
denoted by you in self-talk is taken to have a mind, in which case it may, for example, answer 
back when being reproached. This would then be another, perhaps less pernicious, effect of a 
malfunctioning of the system relating speech and thought. 
  
5.  On variation in self-talk 
 
There seems to be some genuine variation with regard to sentences like (20), as self-
talk:
7
 
 
(20) If I were you, I’d keep my mouth shut from now on. 
                                                          
6
 It is not the case that any instance of I must denote the self’s mind, as it can denote, for example, a 
representation of the self in a photo, as in Look, I’ve got hair down to my shoulders, uttered by me when looking 
at a photo taken of me years ago (see Jackendoff (1992) for discussion of this form of reference). This is an 
indication that the theory sketched here needs some refinement.  
7
 Thanks to Noel Burton-Roberts for discussion of this type of locution. 
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For some speakers (including me) (20) is completely impossible as self-talk, while other self-
talking speakers find it quite natural. 
Sentences like (20) were first discussed in the context of linguistic theory by Lakoff 
(1970), who discussed the sentence (21), attributed to James McCawley: 
 
(21) I dreamt I was Brigitte Bardot, and I kissed me, and then I woke up. 
 
They are interpreted by transfer of reference of I from the speaker to another person: The 
speaker’s mind hypothetically occupies the mind (in (21) also the body) of the other person, 
thereby taking his/her viewpoint on the event described. In Safir’s (2005) words the 
consciousness of the speaker inhabits the viewpoint of another person (see Safir 2004: 89ff., 
2005). 
 For speakers who don’t accept (20) as self-talk, there is a straightforward explanation 
of this in terms of the theory outlined in section 4: Self-talk-you doesn’t have a mind which 
the reference of I could transfer to. But that means that the self-talk-you of speakers who 
accept (20) as self-talk has somewhat different properties: It seems to be ascribed a mind to 
the extent that it can have a viewpoint, although presumably not to the extent that it would 
have intentions or feelings of its own.
8
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